We examine the importance of stockholder}bondholder con#icts in capital-structure choice. Numerical techniques are used to compute the expected wealth transfer between stockholders and bondholders when a "rm adopts a new project. We characterize the set of positive NPV projects that stockholders prefer to ignore and the set of negative NPV projects that stockholders want to accept. The results illustrate how these distortions vary with "rm and project characteristics. We also estimate the impact of stockholder}bondholder con#icts on investment decisions for 23 di!erent "rms and examine 0304-405X/99/$ -see front matter 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 3 0 4 -4 0 5 X ( 9 9 ) 0 0 0 1 5 -X See Fama and Miller (1972) , Jensen and Meckling (1976 ), Merton (1977 ), and Myers (1977 . the extent to which stockholder-bondholder con#icts explain observed cross-sectional variation in capital structures.
Introduction
The "nance profession has been struggling to explain the "nancing choices that "rms make since before Modigliani and Miller published their seminal paper on the topic 40 years ago (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) . Firms use surprisingly large amounts of equity in their capital structures even though the deductibility of interest payments at the corporate level gives debt a tax advantage over equity. A number of explanations, including bankruptcy costs, stockholder}bondholder con#icts, and manager}stockholder con#icts have been suggested to resolve this puzzle, but no consensus has been reached as to their relative importance.
One commonly discussed &cost' of debt arises from the di!ering objectives of stockholders and bondholders. Managers, whose ultimate responsibility is to the stockholders, are likely to make investments that maximize stockholder wealth rather than total "rm value. In particular, managers will tend to avoid safe positive net present value (NPV) projects in which the value increase consists of an increase in the value of the debt and a smaller (in absolute value) decrease in the value of the equity (the underinvestment problem). In addition, managers will tend to accept risky negative NPV projects in which the value decrease consists of a decrease in the value of the debt and a smaller increase in the value of the equity (the overinvestment problem). Because the expected cost of such opportunistic behavior on the part of managers is incorporated into the price of the debt when it is issued, the ex ante solution to this problem is to use less debt in the "rm's capital structure. By this logic, the optimal capital structure for a "rm occurs when the incremental increase in the cost of debt due to agency problems equals the tax bene"ts from such an increase in leverage.
While the impact of stockholder}bondholder con#icts on investment decisions has been widely discussed for two decades, the literature has largely been silent on the magnitude of this e!ect. Perhaps because of the limited evidence on According to Schwert (1993) , Jensen and Meckling (1976) was cited 1132 times between 1974 and Myers (1977 was cited 233 times. While many of the Jensen and Meckling cites refer to the paper's contributions to the theory of the "rm, the Myers (1977) paper is exclusively about corporate "nance. The impact of both papers clearly documents a large interest in the topic by the profession.
See for example Berkovitch and Kim (1990) , Berkovitch et al. (1996) , Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) , John and Nachman (1985) , Kim and Maksimovic (1990) , and Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) . the magnitude of the agency costs of debt, no consensus has been reached on their overall importance. Fama and Miller (1972) , in the "rst discussion of the e!ects, conclude that they are &probably unimportant' (p. 180). Brealey and Myers (1996) emphasize that these problems are &most serious when "rms land in "nancial distress ' (p. 493) , and Myers (1984) barely mentions them in his presidential address on capital structure. On the other hand, Smith and Watts (1992) suggest that stockholder}bondholder con#icts are important determinants of capital structure. Despite, or perhaps because of, the lack of consensus on the importance of these con#icts, they are widely discussed in the capital structure literature. Two early papers that discuss these concepts, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) , are among the most highly cited papers in "nance. In addition, much of the recent corporate theory literature discusses applications of the underinvestment and overinvestment ideas to di!erent settings. The importance of the ideas in these papers ultimately depends on the magnitude of the stockholder}bondholder con#icts underlying them.
Numerical simulations are used to show the impact of debt on the investment decision-making process when decisions are made to maximize stockholder wealth rather than overall "rm value. We compute the magnitude of the wealth transfers between stockholders and bondholders in a levered "rm that result from the adoption of projects with known characteristics. We then characterize the positive NPV projects that will be ignored and the negative NPV projects that will be accepted by stockholders in a "rm with speci"ed leverage and cash #ow characteristics. Finally, sensitivity analyses show how the agency costs of debt vary with "rm and project characteristics.
Consider a hypothetical "rm constructed to be typical of large public U.S.
"rms. For a range of potential projects, the distortion from stockholder}bond-holder con#icts can be represented as the di!erence between the minimum rate of return for the project to be in the interest of stockholders and the minimum rate of return for the project to have a zero NPV. Consistent with arguments in the literature, the simulation results show that levered "rms have incentives to turn down positive NPV projects with stable cash #ows and to accept negative NPV projects with risky cash #ows. For example, stockholders at a hypothetical "rm with a 20% debt to total capital ratio will not want to accept an
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Throughout the paper we use the term &low-risk project' to describe a project that has constant cash #ows from operations as long as the "rm remains in business. The project is not riskless because it is assumed to be integrated with the "rm's other projects and the value of future cash #ows from the project is assumed to be lost if the "rm goes out of business.
In the savings and loan industry, the overinvestment e!ect is exacerbated by deposit insurance (Buser et al., 1981) , so it is not clear what inference to draw from this evidence for "rms without such insurance. For empirical evidence on overinvestment in the savings and loan industry, see Esty (1997a,b) , Hendershott and Kane (1992) , and Kane and Yu (1995). equity-"nanced low-risk project unless the rate of return on the project exceeds the return that yields a zero NPV by 0.14%. The same stockholders would be willing to accept a project whose cash #ows have eight times the volatility of the "rm's cash #ows if the annualized return on this project is 2.35% below the rate that yields a zero NPV. Furthermore, these agency problems increase with leverage. The stockholders of a "rm with 95% debt to total capital will not accept a low-risk equity-"nanced project unless the return is 1.60% above the rate that yields a zero NPV. They will, however, accept a return that is 10.93% below the rate that yields a zero NPV when the project's cash #ows are eight times as volatile as the "rm's cash #ows.
To determine when these con#icts are more or less important, numerical comparative statistics are used to measure the extent to which a number of factors a!ect these distortions. First, a large correlation between project and "rm cash #ows leads to more overinvestment, while a small correlation between project and "rm cash #ows leads to more underinvestment. Second, the relative importance of the underinvestment and overinvestment problems varies greatly with the volatility of the "rm's cash #ows. Overinvestment is likely to be more of a problem at "rms with stable cash #ows while underinvestment is more severe for "rms with volatile cash #ows. Third, the distortions from both underinvestment and overinvestment increase with the duration of the debt in the "rm's capital structure. Finally, both underinvestment and overinvestment distortions are negatively related to the "rm's marginal tax rate.
Estimation of the magnitudes of these agency problems for representative "rms in 23 non-"nancial industries show how these problems vary crosssectionally. While it is clear that there was considerable overinvestment in the savings and loan industry during the 1980s, there is little direct evidence of these problems in other industries. Numerical methods provide a #exible means of estimating the magnitude of agency costs of debt and comparing them directly to other costs and bene"ts of debt, such as bankruptcy costs and tax shields. This numerical approach is complimentary to a growing literature that uses contingent-claims analysis to examine agency problems in corporate "nance (see, e.g., Brennan and Schwartz, 1984; Mello and Parsons, 1992; Leland, 1998) . The contingent-claims approach has the advantage of yielding closed-form See Graham and Smith (1998) for a similar approach to understanding the role of taxes in explaining hedging behavior.
An alternative speci"cation would be one in which cash #ows increase with in#ation according to Cash Flow R "(1#r)Cash Flow R\ eCR where r is the expected rate of in#ation and R is the error term in period t. We prefer the model without drift because it is more consistent with the assumption that the value of the long-term debt outstanding is constant in dollar terms. In addition, the assumption of no drift biases the estimates of the magnitude of the stockholder}bondholder problem upward to the extent that cash #ows ordinarily exhibit positive drift.
solutions. However, to get those solutions, this approach necessarily imposes restrictive assumptions on the models that are examined. For example, Leland (1998) assumes that a constant fraction of debt is retired at every time and that all debt has equal priority. While this is a useful starting point, and indeed we make similar assumptions for our base case results in Section 3, our analysis applies to actual "rms with &irregular' capital structures, as shown in Section 4. Such estimates would be much more di$cult, if not impossible, to obtain using a closed-form approach. In addition, our approach is #exible enough to handle any error structure for the noise terms in both project and "rm cash #ows. This #exibility allows us, for example, to examine how the covariance between the returns from a potential project and the "rm's existing assets a!ects agency problems. The numerical approach can handle any problem with a closed-form solution, but also many more problems that do not have closed-form solutions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the valuation model used in the simulations. Section 3 estimates the magnitude of the distortion in investment incentives that arises due to stockholder}bond-holder con#icts for a typical "rm and the sensitivity of this distortion to various project and "rm characteristics. Section 4 reports estimates of the magnitude of stockholder}bondholder con#icts for actual "rms in non-"nancial industries. Section 5 considers whether the size of the distortion is su$cient to explain cross-sectional variation in capital structure. Finally, Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the implications of the analysis.
Modeling the under-and overinvestment problems
Monte Carlo analysis is used to calculate the expected change in the value of both equity and debt when the "rm adopts a project with a speci"ed distribution of cash #ows. To operationalize this analysis, we begin by assuming, without loss of generality, that the "rm has an initial pre-tax operating cash #ow of $1000. This cash #ow follows a random walk without drift and has a normally distributed error term. The "rm is considering investing in a project that generates annual cash #ows that also follow a random walk without drift. The
The implications of di!erent correlations and project sizes are considered below. expected annual pre-tax operating cash #ow from the project is $100, and the error term of the project's cash #ow process is distributed normally with a standard deviation that varies across simulations. The correlation between the cash #ows from the "rm and the project is assumed to be 0.50. The cash #ows for the "rm and the project follow these processes for 30 years, after which they remain constant. We assume that the project is "nanced entirely with equity.
We use standard techniques to value the equity and debt of the "rm, both with and without the project. These valuations require knowledge of interest rates, the magnitude and maturity structure of the debt outstanding at the time that the project is adopted, and the distributions of the operating cash #ows from the "rm and the project. Values for these variables are based on current market data and data from public "rms. For each simulation, we take 5000 draws from the cash-#ow distributions for both the "rm and the project. For each draw, we compute the value of the debt and equity. Ex ante changes in the values of the debt and equity equal the mean of the changes in these values across the 5000 draws.
The value of the debt
For each draw, we compute the value of the debt outstanding at the time that the project is adopted by discounting the cash #ows that the bondholders can expect to receive by the expected return on debt with comparable risk at the time that the project is adopted. Algebraically,
where < " is the value of the debt, n is the maturity of the debt, and k is the expected return on debt.
Given a draw from the distribution of cash #ows, we "rst calculate the interest and principal payments that the bondholders will receive during each year remaining in the life of the debt. For each year, the cash #ows from operations are compared with the "rm's total interest expense to determine the cash #ows that the original bondholders receive in that year. If the cash #ows from operations exceed the "rm's total interest expense, the bondholders receive the interest payment that they are due. The remaining after-tax cash #ows are "rst used to repay any additional debt (discussed below), and then the residual is distributed to the stockholders. If the cash #ows from operations are less than the "rm's total interest expense, the "rm incurs additional debt su$cient to make its contractual interest payments. The "rm can add additional debt, at the 8
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We also run simulations in which the percentage of the bondholder investment that is lost when the "rm goes out of business is less than 100%. These simulations lead to lower distortions in investment than those reported below. Thus, the assumption that bondholders receive nothing in bankruptcy biases our estimates of the distortions upward. market rate of interest, to the point where the "rm is forced into bankruptcy (discussed below). The additional debt that is incurred to cover cash #ow shortfalls is assumed to be temporary debt that must be repaid with future earnings before any subsequent distributions can be made to stockholders. Also, the "rm refunds any of the original debt that matures through new long-term borrowings. The bondholders receive any principal payments that they are due from the proceeds of these refundings as long as the "rm remains in business. The original bondholders are assumed to lose all of their remaining investment if the "rm goes out of business before they are fully repaid.
Bankruptcy occurs if the present value of the future cash #ows from a particular draw is less than the value of the total outstanding debt and the value actually recovered by the creditors exceeds the liquidation value of the "rm's assets. The original bondholders receive their last payment in the year before bankruptcy occurs. This bankruptcy criterion is consistent with the assumptions concerning the distribution of cash #ows to equityholders, which mimic common dividend restrictions that prevent the distribution of assets that are in place at the time that the debt is issued. E!ectively, the debtholders force the "rm into bankruptcy when prospects for recovery are poor and the orderly liquidation value of the "rm's assets is just su$cient to repay the debtholders what they receive. The liquidation value of the assets is set equal to the value of the "rm in year zero. This assumption is equivalent to assuming that, at the time the project is accepted, the market value and book value of assets are equal, the liquidation value of the assets equals the book value, and the liquidation value of the individual assets remains constant. We use this simplistic assumption concerning the value that would be realized in liquidation because the relation between "rm value and liquidation value is likely to vary considerably across "rms, making it di$cult to identify a point estimate that is reasonable for the &typical' "rm. However, we do examine the sensitivity of our results to the liquidation value assumption.
The total interest expense of the "rm changes from year to year as debt is refunded and as additional debt is issued or retired. Total interest expense in each year equals the sum of the interest expense associated with the original debt that remains outstanding, interest on new long-term debt that has been issued to replace maturing debt, and interest on additional debt that has been issued to cover negative cash #ows and interest expense in previous years, but has not yet been retired. The interest rate at which debt is refunded and additional debt is issued changes from year to year depending on the "nancial condition of the "rm.
We allow "rms to utilize interest tax shields only to the extent that they have taxable income. Consistent with the tax code, "rms can carry unused tax shields forward to o!set future income. However, we do not allow tax loss carrybacks.
The value of the equity
The value of the equity equals the discounted value of all distributions to stockholders over a 30-year period plus the present value of a terminal value at the end of 30 years. The terminal value is computed by assuming that the distributions to stockholders after year 30 are a perpetuity with an annual value equal to the distribution in year 30. The distribution to stockholders in each of the "rst 30 years equals zero when the "rm's net income (calculated as the cash #ow from operations less interest expense and taxes) is not positive. In years when it is positive, net income is "rst used to pay down any additional debt that was issued to cover negative cash #ows and interest expense in prior years, but which has not yet been retired. Stockholders receive all pro"ts once the additional debt has been repaid. The levered cost of equity, which is used to discount distributions to stockholders, is computed using the relation:
where k * is the levered cost of equity, k 3 is the unlevered cost of the equity, < $ is the value of the "rm, < # is the value of the equity, and is the tax rate. Eq. (2) is derived from the formula for the weighted average cost of capital (WACC),
and the formula for WACC proposed by Miles and Ezzell (1980) ,
The unlevered cost of equity is estimated with the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) using the "rm's asset beta.
Calibrating the model
To perform the above calculations we calibrate the model using data on the distributions of operating pro"ts, capital structures, corporate tax rates, and asset betas for public "rms with capital-market data. The medians and means of these variables are presented in Panel A of Table 1 .
First, the standard deviation of the year-to-year percentage change in operating pro"ts is computed for every "rm with su$cient data on the Standard and Table 1 Simulation parameters for the typical "rm. The standard deviation of the percentage change in operating pro"t is estimated using data for all "rms on Compustat that have income statement data for all years from 1981 through 1995. The debt to market value of total capital ratio (book debt/(book debt#market equity)) is calculated with 1995 data and is based on the same set of "rms. Poor's Compustat database for all years from 1981 to 1995. We assume that the actual standard deviation of cash #ows from operations equals the median value of these standard deviations in the simulations. The long-term debt to total capital ratios, equal to 1995 leverage, are computed for the same "rms that are used to estimate the standard deviation of the percentage change in operating pro"t. We use tax rates estimated by Graham (1996a,b) This model is used in all simulations except those for FPL Group, Inc., a utility. Because typical utility coverage ratios di!er substantially from those at other industrial "rms, we estimate a separate relation for the cost of debt for the FPL Group, Inc. simulations. This relation is based on minimum coverage ratios in the utility industry from the 1996 Standard & Poor's Corporate Ratings Criteria report.
The interest expense in each of the 30 years following the adoption of the project is based on the amount of debt outstanding and the cost of the "rm's outstanding debt. The coupon rate of the original debt is set equal to 9.00%, approximately the average cost of A-rated debt during the 1981}1995 period. At the end of each year, the "rm refunds an amount equal to one-"fteenth of its original outstanding debt with a 15-year, "xed rate issue, in which the rate equals the prevailing market rate for debt having comparable risk. Any additional debt that is issued to cover shortfalls in operating cash #ows is also assumed to yield this market rate.
The promised return on debt, for new debt that is issued in each year, is a function of the "rm's "nancial position. We "rst obtain coverage ratios and reported premiums over the long-term Treasury rate as of the end of July 1996 for AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, and B rated debt. The ratios and premiums are listed in Panel B of Table 1 . We estimate the relation between these premiums and the coverage ratios by regressing the log of the premium values against the log of the coverage ratios. The resulting equation, which "ts these data well (adjusted R-squared"0.86) , provides an estimate of the promised premium for any "rm as a function of its coverage ratio.
The expected return on debt, which is used to discount the interest and principal payments at the time that the project is adopted (Eq. (1)), is based on the promised premiums in Panel B of Table 1 , the default rates on debt with di!erent initial credit ratings (from the April 15, 1996 issue of Standard and Poor's CreditWeek), recovery rates on defaulted bonds reported by Carty and Lieberman (1996) , and realized yield spreads reported by Altman (1989) . We "rst use simulations to estimate the expected returns on the individual classes of investment grade debt. Using a 15-year model, for each credit class, the probability of default in each year equals the corresponding default frequency reported in CreditWeek and the recovery rate equals 51.15% of face value, the "gure reported by Carty and Lieberman for senior unsecured debt. For each credit class, we then compute, for 5000 draws from the default frequency distribution, the mean realized premium for 15-year debt with a coupon payment of 9% and a market value implied by the corresponding premium in Panel B of Table 1 . This process yields expected risk premium estimates of 0.45%, 0.51%, 0.64%, and 0.79% for AAA, AA, A, and BBB debt, respectively. The risk premiums for BB and B debt as proportions of the BBB risk premium are based on the relative realized yield spreads reported by Altman. We use this approach to
Estimates of default frequencies for high yield debt are highly sensitive to the set of bonds examined and to the methodology used to estimate them. For example, according to Fridson (1997) , Edward Altman estimated the default rate for high yield debt in 1997 to be 1.25% on a par value basis while Moody's Investors Service reported an estimate of 2.84% for its principal amount series. One important reason for this di!erence is that Moody's estimate includes defaults on noninvestment grade debt sold by issuers based outside of the United States, while Altman's does not.
estimate the expected premiums for the high yield debt because, unlike empirical estimates of default frequencies for investment grade debt, estimated default frequencies for high yield debt vary greatly across data sources. The expected premiums for BB and B debt are estimated to be 1.36% and 1.83%. Finally, the natural log of the expected returns is regressed on the natural log of the coverage ratios reported by S&P for each asset class. This model yields the expected risk premium consistent with the coverage ratio at the time that the project is adopted.
Measuring distortions in investment from stockholder}bondholder con6icts
Simulations are used to measure the stockholder}bondholder con#icts in a typical public "rm. First, we examine whether a typical "rm will accept or reject various equity-"nanced projects, given the "rm's leverage, the levels of the "rm and project cash #ows, and the volatilities of those cash #ows. Model parameters are then varied to show how a "rm's willingness to accept a project is a!ected by the leverage of the "rm, by the correlation between project cash #ows and the "rm's other cash #ows, by the volatility of the "rm's cash #ows, by the size of the project relative to the "rm, by the maturity of the debt, and by the corporate tax rate. We also show how the results change if investors are risk neutral. Finally, potential sources of model bias and misspeci"cation are discussed.
Which projects does a typical xrm accept or reject?
Simulations are "rst used to estimate the magnitude of stockholder}bond-holder con#icts when a typical "rm adopts a project. In the model for the &typical' "rm, "rm parameters are selected to equal median values for public "rms in the United States. We use median values rather than means because a number of the relevant variables, especially the standard deviation of "rm cash #ows, are skewed across "rms (see Panel A of Table 1 ). This calibration process leads to a standard deviation of "rm cash #ows equal to 72.38% of initial cash #ows, a marginal tax rate of 34.40%, and an asset beta of 0.76. The long-term debt to capital ratio is initially set equal to 20%, which is close to the median market-value based long-term debt ratio of 19.18% from Compustat for 1995. Table 2 summarizes the output from a series of simulations in which the expected annual operating cash #ow without the project equals $1000, the Table 2 Debt and equity values for varying project cash #ow standard deviations. The simulations are for a "rm with 20% debt, a zero net present value equity-"nanced project with cash #ows that have a 0.50 correlation with the cash #ows of the "rm, a standard deviation of the "rm's cash #ows equal to 72.38% of initial cash #ows, and a tax rate of 34.40%. Each simulation is based on 5000 draws from the cash-#ow distributions for both the "rm and the project expected annual project operating cash #ow equals $100, and the volatility of the project's cash #ows from operations varies. Each column summarizes the output from one simulation for this typical "rm in which an equity-"nanced project with a particular standard deviation of cash #ows from operations is adopted. In the "rst column, an initial investment of $709.86 is required to make the NPV of the project equal zero. This initial investment equals the present value of the after-tax cash #ows from operations for the project, plus the change in the value of usable tax shields, plus the change in total interest expense attributable to the project. The systematic risk of the cash #ows from operations for the project as a percentage of total risk equals that percentage for the unlevered "rm without the project, times the correlation between the cash #ows for the "rm and the project. The systematic risk of the incremental tax shields and incremental interest expense are assumed to equal that for the levered "rm.
With adoption of this project, the value of the debt increases $13.33 because the overall "rm becomes less risky. Since the NPV of the project is zero, this increase represents a wealth transfer from the stockholders. Although the value of the equity rises by $696.53, the project costs the stockholders $709.86, so existing stockholders lose $13.33. Thus, as Myers (1977) originally argued, stockholders would be worse o! from this project even though it is value-neutral.
As the volatility of the project's cash #ows increases, the initial investment required for a zero NPV project varies because the discount rate increases with the project's systematic risk and the expected cash #ows from the project change. As the risk of the project increases, the wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders falls, because the source of this transfer is the decrease in the overall risk of the "rm. When the standard deviation of the cash #ows reaches 139%, there is no wealth transfer. Above 139% we observe the overinvestment e!ect, in which the zero NPV project transfers wealth from bondholders to stockholders so that stockholders are willing to accept projects even if they have a negative NPV.
Another way to look at the results is, for any risk level, there is a &cuto!' NPV such that a project with a payo! less than the cuto! is unattractive to stockholders, regardless of the project's overall value. This cuto! NPV is positive for relatively safe projects and declines with the project's risk, eventually becoming negative as the projects become very risky. Fig. 1 presents a graph of this cuto! for the typical "rm as a function of the risk of the project's cash #ows. The 20% debt/total capital curve illustrates the NPV required by the stockholders of a "rm with a debt to total capital ratio of 20% for projects of varying risk. The vertical intercept of this graph, which indicates the value for the low-risk project, demonstrates that the project would have to have an NPV of $13.33 to induce the stockholders to accept the project. In other words, the initial cost of the project would have to be $13.33 less than the initial cost of a zero NPV project with the same payo! distribution for stockholders to accept it. As the line moves to the right, corresponding to projects with more volatile cash #ows, the NPV of Fig. 1 . Project NPV necessary to attract additional stockholder investment as a function of the volatility of project cash #ows from operations for "rms with varying debt to total capital ratios. Project cash #ows from operations have a 0.50 correlation with the "rm's cash #ows from operations. Project cash #ows from opearations have an expected annual value of $100 and "rm cash #ows have an expected annual value of $1000. The project is "nanced with equity, the standard deviation of the "rm's cash #ows equals 72.38% of initial cash #ows, and the "rm's tax rate equals 34.40%. the minimum acceptable project falls. The line crosses the horizontal axis when the standard deviation reaches 139%, indicating that, at this point, the stockholders will take all positive NPV projects and no others. When the standard deviation is above 139%, the stockholders are willing to accept some negative NPV projects because the value loss is borne by the bondholders.
The remaining lines on Fig. 1 illustrate the e!ect of varying the quantity of debt in the initial capital structure. This "gure documents that the distortion in investments resulting from stockholder}bondholder con#icts increases with additional debt. The NPV necessary for a low-risk project to be acceptable to stockholders increases from $13.33 to $31.04, $53.37, $82.22, and $117.11 as the debt to total capital ratio increases from 20% to 40%, 60%, 80%, and 95%, respectively.
A useful way of characterizing the above results is to express them in terms of incremental required rates of return. When the NPV necessary for a project to be acceptable to stockholders is positive, stockholders require a rate of return greater than that implied by traditional asset pricing models to undertake a project. When the NPV necessary to attract stockholder investment is negative, stockholders require a lower rate of return. We de"ne the incremental return as the di!erence between the rate of return implied by CAPM and the rate of return required by the stockholders to undertake the investment.
Panel A of Table 3 reports incremental rates of return and the rates of return computed using CAPM (in parentheses) for simulations where the volatility of Table 3 Incremental required rates of return and rates of return required for a project to have a zero NPV (in parentheses) at an unlevered "rm. Returns are reported for varying "rm leverage, correlation between "rm and project cash #ows from operations, volatility of "rm cash #ows, project size, maturity structure of debt, tax rates, and project cash #ow standard deviations. Incremental required rates of return equal the di!erence between the required rate of return for an equity "nanced project at a levered "rm and the required rate of return for the same project at an unlevered "rm. All simulations assume, unless otherwise noted, 20% debt, a zero NPV equity-"nanced project with cash #ows from operations that have a 0.50 correlation with the cash #ows from operations of the "rm, a standard deviation of the "rm's cash #ows from operations equal to 72.38% of initial cash #ows, and a tax rate of 34.40%. Each simulation is based on 5000 draws from the cash-#ow distributions for both the "rm and the project the project's cash #ows and "rm leverage are varied. For these parameters, the adoption of any low-risk project with a return of at least 7.67% increases "rm value, but stockholders would not accept the project unless the return is 7.67%#0.14%"7.81%. The incremental required return decreases with cash #ow volatility, but remains positive until the standard deviation reaches 139%. Beyond this point, stockholders are willing to accept a return that is lower than that computed using CAPM, meaning the incremental return is negative.
The "ve rows in Panel A of Table 3 illustrate how the distortion in investment incentives increases with the amount of debt in a "rm's capital structure. The incremental required rate of return on a low-risk project increases from 0.14% to 0.36% when the debt to total capital ratio increases from 20% to 40%. As the debt to total capital ratio is increased still further to 60%, 80%, and 95%, the incremental required rate of return increases to 0.65%, 1.06%, and 1.60%, respectively. The agency costs of this additional debt come from the value lost from foregone projects with rates of return greater than the return for an all-equity "rm, but less than these hurdle rates. These results are consistent with the common intuition that the agency costs of debt are small for most "rms, but can be substantial for "rms that are highly levered.
The above results are based on the assumption that the liquidation value in bankruptcy equals the initial value of the "rm. Under reasonable alternative liquidation assumptions, the required rates of return are modestly higher. For example, if the liquidation value equals 50% of the initial "rm value, the incremental rates of return for a low-risk project are 0.18%, 0.45%, 0.90%, 1.45%, and 1.99% for debt to total capital ratios of 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, and 95%, respectively. These rates are higher because a lower liquidation value limits the ability of a poorly performing "rm to issue additional debt to "nance interest payments.
The project's correlation with the xrm's other assets
The impact of a particular project on the overall volatility of a "rm's cash #ows, and hence on any potential wealth transfers, depends on the correlation between the project's cash #ows and the cash #ows from the "rm's existing assets. In the simulations discussed above, with a correlation of 0.50, it is necessary for a project to have operating cash #ows with a standard deviation above 139% to get overinvestment. There are two reasons that this level of volatility is substantially larger than the standard deviation of 72.38% for the rest of the "rm's cash #ows. First, because the project is "nanced entirely with equity, the adoption of the project increases the level of assets securing the original bondholder claims. Consequently, the curves in Fig. 1 shift upward, relative to the curves for a project "nanced with debt and equity, thereby moving the intercept with the horizontal axis to the right. Second, and more important, is a diversi"cation e!ect. Since the project's cash #ows are not Fig. 2 . Project NPV necessary to attract additional stockholder investment as a function of volatility of project cash #ows from operations for varying correlations between project and "rm cash #ows. The "rm has a debt to total capital ratio of 20%. Project cash #ows from operations have an expected annual value of $100 and "rm cash #ows from operations have an expected annual value of $1000. The project is "nanced with equity, the standard deviation of the "rm's cash #ows equals 72.38% of initial cash #ows, and the "rm's tax rate equals 34.40%.
perfectly correlated with the rest of the cash #ows from the "rm, the cash #ows from the project provide a diversi"cation bene"t.
It is likely that there will be some degree of positive correlation between the cash #ows of a typical project and those of the "rm. First, each set of cash #ows is likely to contain a market-wide component a!ecting each similarly. Second, most new projects are likely to have some element of complimentarity with existing projects. Without such complimentarity, Coasian considerations suggest that there would be no bene"t to adopting a project. However, it is not clear exactly how much correlation one should expect a priori between the "rm's existing assets and a new project. We therefore present simulation results for the median "rm for a variety of di!erent correlations in Fig. 2 and in Panel B of Table 3 .
The results are consistent with the diversi"cation arguments. All of the lines in Fig. 2 intersect the vertical axis at the same point, since correlation is not an issue for projects with constant cash #ows from operations. The lines representing higher degrees of correlation slope downward more steeply. Because the diversi"cation e!ect is smaller with higher correlations, "rm risk increases faster with project risk when correlations are high. Projects with operating cash #ows that are highly correlated with "rm cash #ows thus enter the overinvestment 22
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The curve in Fig. 2 for the case in which the correlation between the operating cash #ows for the "rm and the project equals 1.00 crosses the horizontal axis when the standard deviation of the operating cash #ows from the project is 85%. The di!erence between this 85% value and the 72.38% standard deviation for the cash #ows for the rest of the "rm is due to the additional security provided bondholders by the decision to "nance the project entirely with equity. Fig. 3 . Project NPV necessary to attract additional stockholder investment as a function of volatility of project cash #ows from operations for "rms with varying cash #ow volatilities. The "rm has a debt to total capital ratio of 20%. Project cash #ows from operations have a 0.50 correlation with the "rm's cash #ows from operations. Project cash #ows from operations have an expected annual pretax value of $100 and "rm cash #ows have an expected annual pretax value of $1000. The project is "nanced with equity and the "rm's tax rate equals 34.40%.
region more quickly than projects with less correlated cash #ows. These results suggest that overinvestment is a more important issue for scale-expanding projects, which are likely to have high correlations with existing projects, while underinvestment is more of an issue for diversifying projects.
The volatility of the xrm's cash yows
There is considerable cross-sectional variation in the volatility of "rm cash #ows. Fig. 3 and Panel C of Table 3 present results for simulations in which the volatility of the "rm's cash #ows is set equal to the cash #ow volatility for the median "rm in the gas and electric utility industry (26.54%), the median "rm on Compustat (72.38%), and the median "rm in the primary metals industry (130.71%). Because the gas and electric and primary metals industries both tend to have relatively few growth opportunities, the resulting variation in underinvestment and overinvestment problems comes from di!erences in cash #ow volatility, and not from the asset-in-place versus growth opportunity distinction.
The simulation results in Fig. 3 and Panel C of Table 3 suggest that a "rm with low cash #ow volatility, such as a gas and electric utility, is not severely a!ected by underinvestment considerations. The incremental required return for a low-risk project is only 0.03%. However, such a "rm faces a potentially greater overinvestment problem than a "rm with greater cash #ow volatility. The incremental required return for a project with a standard deviation of cash #ows equal to 600% is a relatively large !24.77%. The reverse is true for "rms with relatively high cash #ow volatilities, such as those in the primary metals industry. A "rm with high cash #ow volatility has a considerably higher incremental rate of return for a low-risk project (0.20%) but a substantially lower incremental return for high-risk projects (!0.40%) when compared to a "rm with low cash-#ow volatility. Intuitively, if a "rm has assets generating cash #ows with high volatility, not many projects will increase this volatility, so overinvestment is not much of a problem. However, it is relatively easy to decrease such a "rm's cash #ow volatility, so underinvestment is a larger problem for "rms with high initial cash #ow volatility.
The size of the project relative to the size of the xrm
The size of the project relative to the size of "rm also a!ects the magnitude of the distortion. To investigate how the distortion from stockholder}bondholder con#icts varies with project size, we calculate the magnitude of the distortion for projects of various sizes. The results of these simulations are summarized in Fig. 4 and Panel D of Table 3 . Fig. 4 shows that, not surprisingly, the magnitude of the wealth transfer is positively related to project size. A low-risk project with annual EBIT of $500 requires an NPV of $48.10 to be acceptable to the stockholders, while a low-risk project with annual cash #ows of $50 requires an NPV of $7.21. Large projects enter the overinvestment region with considerably lower cash #ow volatility than small projects. For example, the line in Fig. 3 for the project with annual cash #ows from operations of $500 crosses the horizontal axis at 122% as compared with 170% for a project with annual cash #ows from operations of $50. For projects with a su$ciently high risk to induce overinvestment, the minimum NPV for stockholders to accept the project is more negative for large projects than for small ones.
However, when we convert these NPVs to rates of return in Panel D of Table 3 , the distortion appears to be slightly larger for small projects than for large projects. A low-risk project that pays $50 per year requires an incremental return of 0.16% to entice the stockholders to invest, compared to an incremental return of 0.10% for a project with cash #ows of $500 per year. At high levels of risk, the (overinvestment) distortion is larger for small projects, but the distortion is not strictly decreasing with project size. Fig. 4 . Project NPV necessary to attract additional stockholder investment as a function of volatility of project cash #ows from operations for varying project sizes. The "rm has a debt to total capital ratio of 20% and cash #ows from operations have an expected annual value of $1000. Project cash #ows from operations have a 0.50 correlation with the "rm's cash #ows. The project is "nanced with equity, the standard deviation of the "rm's cash #ows equals 72.38% of initial cash #ows, and the "rm's tax rate equals 34.40%.
The maturity of the debt
The simulations discussed to this point assume that the "rm refunds one-"fteenth of its debt each period. We choose this debt maturity structure to be typical of a "rm that is "nancing relatively long-term assets. However, it is important to know the extent to which our results are sensitive to this assumption. In addition, we wish to evaluate the argument that longer-maturity debt is more subject to stockholder}bondholder con#icts (see, e.g., Myers, 1977; Barclay and Smith, 1995; Guedes and Opler, 1996) . Fig. 5 and Panel E of Table 3 present simulation results for the typical "rm with varying maturity structures of the debt. In addition to the case of the "rm with debt that matures uniformly over 15 years (which is repeated for convenience), we also report results for a "rm with debt that matures uniformly over 30 years, a "rm with one issue of 15-year zero-coupon debt, and a "rm with debt that matures uniformly over a three-year period. The durations of the 30-year amortizing and 15-year zero-coupon debt are longer than that of the 15-year amortizing debt (5.75 years for the debt maturing uniformly over 15 years, compared to 8.37 years for the debt maturing uniformly over 30 years and 15.00 years for the 15-year zero-coupon debt), while the duration of the three-year debt, 1.90 years, is shorter. "rm has a debt to total capital ratio of 20%. Project cash #ows from operations have a 0.50 correlation with the "rm's cash #ows from operations. Project cash #ows from opearations have an expected annual value of $100 and "rm cash #ows from operations have an expected annual value of $1000. The project is "nanced with equity, the standard deviation of the "rm's cash #ows equals 72.38% of initial cash #ows, and the "rm's tax rate equals 34.40%.
This result also provides justi"cation for ignoring short-term liabilities in the analysis in the previous section.
It is clear from Fig. 5 and Panel E of Table 3 that longer duration debt leads to larger agency problems. The lines for debt with longer durations slope downward more steeply than those for debt with shorter durations. In addition, the line representing the "rm with three-year debt is extremely close to the horizontal axis, indicating that, for a "rm with relatively short-term debt, there are essentially no agency costs from stockholder}bondholder con#icts. The intuition for this e!ect is that the probability of cash #ows going su$ciently negative to cause the "rm to default is positively related to the duration of the debt. As the duration of the debt increases, the value of the debt becomes more sensitive to the "rm's asset structure. Consequently, the adoption of a project with cash #ow characteristics that di!er from those of the "rm has a greater impact on the value of longer-term debt. Table 3 repeat the base-case analysis with varying marginal tax rates. Fig. 6 shows that the dollar value of the wealth transfer is 26
The marginal tax rate
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Fig. 6. Project NPV necessary to attract additional stockholder investment as a function of volatility of project cash #ows from operations for "rms with varying tax rates. The "rm has a debt to total capital ratio of 20%. Project cash #ows from operations have a 0.50 correlation with the "rm's cash #ows from operations. Project cash #ows from opearations have an expected annual pretax value of $100 and "rm cash #ows have an expected annual pretax value of $1000. The project is "nanced with equity and the standard deviation of the "rm's cash #ows equals 72.38% of initial cash #ows.
negatively related to the marginal corporate tax rate. This result occurs because a lower tax rate e!ectively increases the size of the project relative to the size of the "rm. While after-tax cash #ows from operations for the project and the "rm increase in the same proportion with a decrease in the tax rate, the value of the tax shields realized by the "rm decreases, causing the value of the "rm to decline relative to that of the project. Despite the larger wealth transfer at lower tax rates, Panel F shows that the incremental rates of return do not vary substantially with changes in tax rates. The change in the dollar value of the cash #ows from the project is proportionate to the change in the magnitude of the wealth transfer.
Risk-neutral investors
The way that we adjust for risk also a!ects the simulation results. There are two key assumptions regarding risk-adjustments implicit in the model. First, we assume that the CAPM holds. Second, we assume that the systematic risk of the project cash #ows increases with their overall volatility. The extent to which our analysis rests on these assumptions is important, especially given the recent literature critical of this approach to computing the cost of capital (see, for example, Fama and French, 1992,1997) . Fig. 7 . Project NPV necessary to attract additional stockholder investment as a function of volatility of project cash #ows from operations for "rms with varying debt to total capital ratios. Stockholders are assumed to be risk neutral. Project cash #ows from operations have a 0.50 correlation with the "rm's cash #ows from operations. Project cash #ows from opearations have an expected annual value of $100 and "rm cash #ows have an expected annual value of $1000. The project is "nanced with equity, the standard deviation of the "rm's cash #ows equals 72.38% of initial cash #ows, and the "rm's tax rate equals 34.40%.
An alternative approach would be to contrast the results with results obtained using a di!erent approach to computing the cost of capital, such as the Fama and French three-factor model.
To assess the extent to which our results are a!ected by this approach to risk-adjustment, we recalculate the base-case results from Fig. 1 for the case of a risk-neutral investor. This recalculation is based on the assumption that investors discount all cash #ows at the risk-free rate of 7.16%. The results of these simulations are presented in Fig. 7 and Panel G of Table 3 . The lines in Fig. 7 generally intersect the vertical axis at higher points and slope downward more quickly than the corresponding lines in Fig. 1 . When we express the distortion as a rate of return (Panel G of Table 3), the distortion is generally smaller for the risk-neutral case than for the base case. Overall, these simulation results suggest that the investment distortions from stockholder}bondholder con#icts are similar to those in the base case even if all investors are risk-neutral. Therefore, it is unlikely that alternative discount factors would lead to qualitative conclusions that are di!erent from those discussed above.
Is the model likely to overstate or understate the agency cost of debt?
The simulations require that we make a number of modeling choices that a!ect the size of stockholder}bondholder con#icts. We have tried to make assumptions that generally lead to the largest possible estimate of the distortion from stockholder}bondholder con#icts. Three such assumptions are that absolute priority holds in bankruptcy, that any additional debt that is sold to cover the di!erence between cash #ows and interest obligations is senior to the original debt, and that the original bondholders lose all of their remaining investment if the "rm goes out of business. These assumptions lead to larger distortions because they maximize the potential loss to the original bondholders and thereby the potential gain (loss) from the underinvestment (overinvestment) problems.
We also assume that the indenture agreements covering the original debt do not contain some common covenants, such as those restricting investments, conversion features, or security clauses. Each of these provisions helps to control the overinvestment (asset substitution) problem (see Smith and Warner, 1979) . These considerations suggest that the magnitudes of the distortions reported above can be viewed as upper bounds on the true magnitudes of stockholder}bondholder con#icts. However, as the approach we use is relatively new, it is possible that some parameters in the model or model misspeci"cation cause the magnitude of these con#icts to be understated. For example, the estimates will be low to the extent that we over-estimate the liquidation value of the "rm's assets.
Two potential sources of misspeci"cation are the assumption that cash #ows follow a random walk and the focus on a single investment decision. The assumption that cash #ows follow a random walk does not allow for the possibility that changes in a "rm's revenue and cost structure in a particular year are systematically related to prior performance. If a "rm's performance declines, managers may make decisions that make matters worse in subsequent years. Advertising may be cut back dramatically, sta$ng levels may be reduced beyond the optimal level, or important investments may be postponed. In addition, decisions by other parties that contract with the "rm, such as suppliers and customers, are likely to be a!ected by the performance of the "rm. For example, in the computer industry, poor performance by a hardware manufacturer may prompt suppliers to tighten credit terms, software "rms to reduce the variety of compatible software that they produce for the "rm's products, and customers to reduce the quantity of the "rm's products that they purchase. These sorts of decisions can increase the likelihood of bankruptcy and thereby the magnitudes of the distortions that we are trying to quantify. Similarly, the model does not take into account interactions between investments over time. The decision to accept or reject a project today may impact future investment decisions. This, in turn, can a!ect both the level and the riskiness of future cash #ows from the "rm. An investment in risky assets today may lead to more or less risky or more or less pro"table investments in the future, depending on factors such as project complementarities and the realized level of subsequent cash #ows. Modeling such interactions is likely to yield estimates of the magnitudes of underinvestment and overinvestment problems that are di!erent from those that we report.
Two "rms have debt that matures after 2026. For these "rms, all of the original debt that remains outstanding at the end of 2025 is assumed to mature in 2026.
Cross-sectional di4erences in stockholder}bondholder con6icts
The analysis to this point illustrates how project and "rm characteristics determine the magnitude of stockholder}bondholder con#icts. The sensitivity analyses presented in Figs. 1}7 and in Table 3 examine how a change in an individual characteristic a!ects the magnitude of stockholder}bondholder con#icts at a &typical "rm'. However, it is unlikely that the characteristics of an individual "rm and its projects will mirror those of the &typical "rm' used in the above analysis, so it is not evident how the estimates presented above apply to actual "rms. This section calibrates the model to re#ect the characteristics of individual "rms and presents estimates of the stockholder}bondholder con#ict for these "rms. Results show how the characteristics of both existing assets and potential projects a!ect the magnitude of stockholder}bondholder con#icts at actual "rms.
Firm-level estimates
The "rms used in this analysis are selected to be representative of the "rms from a broad cross-section of 23 non-"nancial industries. Panel A of Table 4 summarizes characteristics of the speci"c "rms selected for this analysis. We calibrate the model for each "rm as follows:
(1) Cash yows of the xrm: The initial pretax cash #ow is set equal to the 1996 operating pro"ts of the "rm, and the cash #ow distribution is assumed to follow a random walk with drift. The standard deviation of the percentage change in the cash #ows from operations is set equal to the standard deviation of the percentage change in operating pro"ts for the "rm over the 1981}1995 period. The drift term is selected, after all other parameters, so that the expected value of the equity without the project equals the market value of the "rm's equity as of July 30, 1996. (2) Maturity structure and cost of debt: Data on the actual maturity structure of the "rm's outstanding debt and the interest rates on that debt are obtained from the "nancial footnotes in the "rm's 1997 Annual Report. We set the maturity structure of the "rm's debt equal to the dollar value of the debt maturing in each year from 1997 through 2026. The e!ective interest rate on the debt that remains outstanding in each year is used to compute the interest expense in the model. (3) Project size: The value of the project equals the sum of the "rm's capital expenditures plus its after-tax research and development expenditures 30
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Chiquita Brands does not have the highest overinvestment distortion listed in Table 4 because it enters the &overinvestment region' at the highest level of project cash #ow volatility.
(CAPEX#R&D) in 1996. Annual cash #ows from the project are computed by multiplying the ratio of CAPEX#R&D to the sum of the book value of the "rm's debt and the market value of its equity as of July 30, 1996 by the "rm's 1996 operating pro"ts. (4) Other parameters: The marginal tax rate is obtained from Graham (1996a,b) , and the "rm's asset beta is estimated by unlevering the beta reported by Value Line in late 1996. These calibrations e!ectively turn our general model into a detailed valuation model for each of the 23 "rms.
The results of the "rm-level simulations are presented in Panels B}D of Table 4 . Panel B presents the results in terms of the dollar values of the wealth transfers, Panel C interprets them in terms of incremental rates of return (assuming the projects have no systematic risk), and Panel D illustrates the impact of the wealth transfers on the "rms' cost of debt. The results show that the distortions vary substantially across "rms, but are generally consistent with the estimates in Fig. 1 and in Panel A of Table 3 . Chiquita Brands, which has the highest leverage (63.01% debt to total capital) in the sample and relatively high cash #ow volatility (standard deviation of 87.11%), also has the largest underinvestment problem. For Chiquita, the wealth transfer from the adoption of a low-risk project equals 14.6% of the value of the "rm's CAPEX#R&D ($10.89/$74.64). When this wealth transfer is restated as an incremental required rate of return, the 1.30% "gure (Panel C of Table 4 ) is considerably larger than the 0.65% "gure for the low-risk project at a "rm with 60% debt in Panel A of Table 3 . The di!erence between the 1.30% and 0.65% "gures is attributable to the higher leverage and cash #ow volatility for Chiquita Brands relative to our hypothetical "rm, as well as a substantially lower cash #ow coverage ratio in the early years. These factors combine to result in a greater likelihood of default, particularly in the early years, relative to the typical "rm. Although the potential distortions in investment decisions at Chiquita are particularly large, the median value of the incremental required rate of return for low-risk projects in Panel C of Table 4 is reasonably close to the value estimated in our base case calculations (0.15% versus 0.14% in Panel A of Table 3) .
One factor whose importance is particularly well illustrated by the calculations for the individual "rms is maturity of the debt. For example, Ethyl Corporation, despite an above-average long-term debt to total capital ratio of 23.76%, has virtually no stockholder}bondholder distortion. This occurs because Ethyl's debt, while long-term by the accounting de"nition, has a relatively short duration of 3.44 years. Similar results are evident for Dravo, Media General, and Chrysler. Although the debt to total capital ratio at each of these Table 4 Simulation parameters, magnitude of wealth transfers, incremental required rates of return on equiity, and incremental costs of debt for individual "rms. "rms is above 25%, the magnitude of the stockholder}bondholder con#icts at these "rms is small because a relatively high percentage of the debt matures quickly. The incremental cost of debt values reported in Panel D of Table 4 represent the change in the cost of debt attributable to agency problems, should one of the 23 "rms adopt a zero NPV project with a speci"ed cash #ow volatility. The incremental cost of debt is higher at "rms, like Cummins and UAL, which make larger investments. This is consistent with growth opportunity arguments. At both "rms, adopting a project with a standard deviation of operating cash #ows of 600% would increase the cost of debt by more than 150 basis points relative to a project that keeps the "rm's cash #ows equally risky. These results also suggest that there is considerable variation across "rms in the likely impact of underinvestment and overinvestment problems on borrowing costs. Presumably, the "rms with the largest potential agency problems will bene"t most from restrictive debt covenants.
Asset risk and investment opportunities
The analysis presented above demonstrates how stockholder}bondholder con#icts distort a "rm's investment decisions, taking into account the attributes of both the "rm's existing assets and its potential projects. In contrast, the stockholder}bondholder literature predominately focuses on the total value of potential projects, usually summarized as the level of &growth opportunities' available to "rms (see Myers, 1977; Smith and Watts, 1992) . The evidence reported here shows that the value of investment opportunities alone is not su$cient to assess the extent of stockholder}bondholder con#icts. Other factors, such as the riskiness of the "rm's and the projects' cash #ows and the correlations between the cash #ows of the "rm and projects, must be considered as well.
For example, the generally high leverage at utility "rms is often explained by noting that because the regulatory process limits the growth opportunities available to these "rms, utility executives have limited opportunities to invest in projects that transfer wealth from bondholders. Consequently, underinvestment and overinvestment are not of great concern in the utility industry. However, the analysis in this paper suggests that the characteristics of both the investment opportunities available to utility "rms and their existing assets also a!ect the magnitude of stockholder}bondholder con#icts. Since utility "rms tend to have assets with low cash #ow volatility, the incentives that utilities have to engage in underinvestment are small (see Section 3.3.). As long as there are restrictions on the ability of utilities to engage in overinvestment, stockholder}bondholder con#icts will be small in this industry.
This assumes that the "rm can make this change costlessly or, more realistically, that the "rm has historically examined these issues when making "nancing or payout decisions that could a!ect capital structure.
These tax shields are computed using the numerical model, so they incorporate the probability that the "rm will not be able to utilize the shields it generates. They also account for di!erential rates at the personal and corporate level. They assume that that interest income is taxed at 39.6% (the top federal marginal individual rate in 1996) and that returns to equity holders are taxed at an average rate of 28% (the top federal capital gains rate in 1996). This calculation assumes that the cash #ows from the project are realized in perpetuity.
5. To what extent can stockholder+bondholder con6icts explain capital structure?
The analysis so far has quanti"ed the nature of the distortion in investment induced by stockholder}bondholder con#icts. However, the overall importance of these con#icts to the "rm depends on the number of available projects that are a!ected by this distortion. For example, the analysis shows that for a typical "rm, the equityholders will require a 0.14% return premium with a 20% debt to total capital ratio and a 0.36% return premium with a 40% debt to total capital ratio (Panel A of Table 3 ) to invest in a low-risk project. Unfortunately, since there is no way for an outsider to know exactly how many positive NPV projects do not meet these higher hurdle rates, we do not know exactly how many potential projects a typical "rm has that will be a!ected by underinvestment. The value lost because of overinvestment is similarly unknown.
We can, however, get some idea of the importance of the value lost because of these con#icts by comparing the value loss to the tax shields that would be created by using additional debt. Suppose, as in Myers (1977) , that the optimal capital structure is determined by a tradeo! between the tax advantages of debt and underinvestment considerations. This implies that stockholders will increase leverage to the point where the marginal foregone positive NPV projects have a value equal to the tax shields from the incremental debt. Because the results presented above provide the rates of return on the foregone projects, we can calculate how much the "rm must be investing to achieve this value and examine the feasibility of this level of investment.
To illustrate, suppose a "rm is considering increasing its debt to total capital ratio from 20% to 40%. For the hypothetical "rm in our simulations, the expected change in the value of the tax shields to investors would be $118.71 (the expected value of $226.64 with 40% debt less the expected value of $107.93 with 20% debt). The level of investment necessary to o!set this tax shield, from the stockholder's perspective, is $118.71(r { /(Ir !Ir { )) where Ir is the incremental required return on the average project that is foregone because of the increase in leverage, r { is the return at which the stockholders of a "rm with 20% debt are indi!erent with regard to the project and Ir { is the incremental required return with 20% debt. For example,
The value of the foregone projects depends on the wedge between the hurdle rates for the current debt level and the rates for the debt level in question. This wedge is slightly higher for moderate risk projects than for low-risk projects. Nonetheless, the basic conclusion of this section, that the e!ect is too small to explain the majority of debt/equity choices, still holds. Moyen (1997) , using a contingent claims approach, examines this issue as well and reports similar conclusions.
The personal tax rate on equity income can be zero if the "rm pays no dividends and the individual investor defers the unrealized capital gain into his or her estate. Graham (1998) "nds that the value of corporate tax shields are approximately equal to 10% of "rm value, which suggests that there is a substantial tax advantage to debt. assume that the average project foregone is a low-risk project with an incremental required return of 0.25% (which is midway between the 0.14% incremental required return for the "rm with 20% leverage and the 0.36% incremental required return on equity for the "rm with 40% leverage). In this example, the "rm would have to be planning to invest at least $8428.41 [equal to $118.71(0.0781)/(0.0025!0.0014)] in these low-risk projects for underinvestment considerations to o!set the value of the tax shields. Since $8428.41 is 1.58 times the expected value of the "rm ($5349 with 20% debt) and 12.85 times the annual after-tax cash #ow from operations, it is unlikely that the "rm is investing that much in positive NPV projects with incremental rates of return in the ranges indicated in Table 3 .
While these calculations suggest that underinvestment considerations are not su$cient to o!set the value of the tax shields, it is important to recognize that this conclusion is sensitive to our assumptions concerning the e!ective marginal corporate tax rate and the tax rates that investors must pay on returns from debt and equity. For example, Miller (1977) points out that if the personal tax rate on interest income equals the marginal corporate tax rate and the personal rate on equity is e!ectively zero, then there are no purely tax gains from "nancial leverage. Similarly, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) show that the presence of alternative tax shields can reduce the e!ective marginal corporate tax rate and, thereby, the net value of the incremental tax shields from an increase in leverage. On the other hand, the value of tax shields from debt to a tax-exempt investor is likely to be larger than our estimate if alternative tax shields do not substantially reduce corporate tax rates.
Another way to see how small these estimates of the incremental returns required by a typical "rm are is to compare them to the noise in traditional estimates of the cost of capital. Fama and French (1997) report that the standard errors of state-of-the-art estimates of the cost of capital are typically more than 3% per year. This value is more than twenty times the maximum distortion from underinvestment for the typical "rm. Relative to both the estimated tax shields and the measurement error in traditional cost of capital estimates, the estimated Jensen (1986 Jensen ( ,1993 and Stulz (1990) , among others, also propose non-tax advantages of debt. In particular, they argue that debt reduces the agency problem between managers and stockholders by lowering their incentives to waste the "rm's excess cash on negative NPV projects. To the extent that these arguments are correct, they reinforce the basic puzzle of why "rms do not use more debt. distortion in investment from stockholder}bondholder con#icts appears to be small.
Results imply that distortions for the projects in these simulations are not large enough to explain capital structure decisions in most cases. As discussed in Section 3.8, it is possible the model is misspeci"ed. However, consistent with the idea that the incentives to transfer wealth are relatively small, Andrade and Kaplan (1998) "nd that, even for "rms in "nancial distress, there is little evidence of stockholders transferring wealth through risk-shifting. Nonetheless, the possibility of extreme gambles much riskier than the projects considered here can potentially lead to substantially larger distortions and to a di!erent interpretation. The existence of covenants restricting certain kinds of investment suggests that this possibility is a serious issue to purchasers of bonds.
Conclusions
Despite over 40 years of research, we still know surprisingly little about the determinants of capital structure. There is general agreement that debt has a tax advantage over equity, but disagreement over the magnitude of this tax advantage and the relative importance of the costs of debt that o!set this tax advantage at the margin. One explanation for the relatively low debt levels in American corporations is that agency problems inherent in the di!ering objectives of stockholders and bondholders o!set the tax advantages of debt. It has been argued that stockholder}bondholder con#icts are an important determinant of capital structure (Smith and Watts, 1992) , have major consequences for the ways distressed "rms reorganize (Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991) , and even have macroeconomic implications (Lamont, 1995) .
We numerically estimate the magnitude of these stockholder}bondholder con#icts using a Monte Carlo simulation approach. Our approach uses standard valuation techniques to value the "rm's debt and equity, and, for speci"ed "rm parameters, calculates the magnitude of the agency costs of debt. This approach is an improvement on contingent-claims methods because it imposes no restrictions on cash #ow distributions or on the "rm's capital structure.
These simulations produce estimates of the distortion in investment arising from stockholder}bondholder con#icts. These estimates are based on parameters selected to re#ect market rates of return, actual capital structures, and the most recent estimates of corporate tax rates. We emphasize, however, that the estimates are preliminary. Improvements are likely to come from using more capital structures. These results are inconsistent with the conventional interpretations of the evidence reported by Smith and Watts (1992) , Gaver and Gaver (1993) , Barclay and Smith (1995), and Rajan and Zingales (1995) . These papers "nd that high growth option "rms tend to use lower quantities of debt and that their debt tends to be of shorter duration than the debt of "rms with more assets in place. Our results suggest that factors other than investment distortions from stockholder}bondholder con#icts are responsible for these regularities and that, at a minimum, we should re-examine the conventional explanations.
